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Abstract 
The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in the midst of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was seen by many as a radical innovation 
in security thinking and practice.  This paper examines the security implications of 
international justice in the Balkans by situating the analysis within the broader context of 
international interventions in the region.  The paper starts by elaborating a distinctive 
conception of ‘security’ that emerges from the pursuit of international justice, addressing 
questions such as security for whom, security from what, and security by what means.  It then 
examines the jurisprudence of the ICTY to determine whether judicial practice has tended to 
promote this distinctive approach to security.  The final section explores the interactions of 
international justice and liberal peace interventions in the Balkans, focusing in particular on 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The paper argues that the revival of 
international justice half a century after the Nuremberg Trials can be understood as signaling 
a shift in security paradigms from statism to human rights, while also giving rise to deep 
tensions between them.  These tensions are most clearly expressed in the interactions of 
international justice with other security instruments of the liberal peace, which are often 
employed by the international community in situations where international crimes occur.  
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1. Introduction 
The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in the midst of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was hailed by some as a development that 
marked the beginning of the end of impunity for egregious human rights violations, ushering 
in an era in which global security policy would be underpinned by concern for the security of 
individuals and communities and not only the security of States.  Others were much more 
sceptical, however, arguing that the international community of States, acting through the UN 
Security Council and its Chapter VII powers to maintain international peace and security, was 
setting up courts to prosecute atrocities it could have prevented from occurring in the first 
place, staging trials instead of putting their soldiers’ lives on the line to protect civilians.   
Neither side was wrong. The deliberations at the Security Council that led to the 
creation of the Tribunal were dominated by statements expressing concern for the plight of 
civilians in the Balkans and enthusiasm for a revival of the Nuremberg legacy that could pave 
the way for a permanent international criminal court.
2
  In less than a decade, the International 
Criminal Court had been established and questions of accountability and justice for serous 
international crimes were featuring regularly in global security discussions.  Shortly after it 
had decided to put in place a tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council was 
preoccupied with the unfolding genocide in Rwanda.  A twin court, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was set up in the wake of the most dramatic failure of the 
international community since the end of the Cold War to prevent and stop mass slaughter: 
“Law became a euphemism for inaction.”3        
These early debates are still relevant because they highlight the need to analyse the 
role of international justice in the security arena at two levels: with respect to the evolving 
normative underpinnings of security concepts and practices and, at the same time, in relation 
to other security instruments that are employed (or not) by the international community 
alongside international justice.  Understanding the distinctive logic of international justice as a 
security instrument is important but insufficient on its own; it has to be complemented by an 
examination of the interactions of international justice with other security instruments that are 
simultaneously deployed and brought to bear in a particular context, especially when such 
instruments may constrain or reinforce the pursuit of justice in significant ways.  
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This article examines the security implications of international justice in the Balkans 
by situating the analysis within the broader context of international interventions in the 
region.  It argues that the revival of international justice half a century after the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials could be interpreted as signaling a shift in security paradigms from statism to 
human rights while also giving rise to deep tensions between them.  These tensions are most 
clearly expressed in the interactions of international justice with a set of security instruments 
associated with the ‘liberal peace’, which in one form or another have been routinely 
employed in situations where serious international crimes occur since the 1990s.
4
  The 
argument is elaborated in relation to the Balkans, a region that has served as a laboratory for 
the international community in developing both transitional justice and liberal peace 
approaches to conflict-affected states.  The concurrent evolution of these approaches over the 
past two decades has reinforced the idea that transitional justice is central to liberal 
peacebuilding and claims to that effect have become commonplace among practitioners and 
scholars.
5
  The analysis presented here suggests that such claims should be treated with 
caution, however, and calls for a critical re-consideration of the relationship between 
transitional justice and the liberal peace.  It also raises questions about a core set of critiques 
of the liberal peace that identify as the main problem the ‘liberalism’ of the interveners: “If 
only they were not, in various ways, so liberal, then it is alleged external intervention or 
assistance may potentially be much less problematic.”6 
The contribution reflects the overall preoccupation of the special issue with ‘security 
cultures’ as an analytical lens for investigating the role of law and justice in global security.  
A security culture combines a set of ideas and a set of practices that tend to reinforce each 
other. As Kaldor points out, a security culture is not a static concept; it is constructed and has 
to be continuously reproduced: “Understanding the mechanisms through which cultures are 
constructed enables us to identify openings and closures – points at which policy innovations 
are possible and where they are stuck…  The aim is to substantiate specific security cultures 
                                                 
4
 The article focuses on security instruments at the sharp end of the ‘liberal peace’, which refers to a broader set 
of interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states based on the idea that peace depends on the existence of 
liberal political and economic institutions that are functioning and effective, and aimed at constructing liberal 
polities, economies, and societies. See, e.g, A Bellamy, ‘The “Next Stage” in Peace Operations Theory’, in A 
Bellamy and P Williams (eds) Peace Operations and Global Order (Routledge 2007); M Duffield, Global 
Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (Zed Books 2001); R Paris, At War’s 
End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (CUP 2002); O Richmond, ‘The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 
“Liberal Peace”’ (2006) 6(3) Conflict, Security & Development 291-314. 
5
 See Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary 
General, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (223 August 2004). See generally CL Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace? Liberal 
Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice’ (2007) 21(4) Global Society 579-591. 
6
 D Chandler, ‘The Uncritical Critique of ‘Liberal Peace’’ (2010) 36 Rev of Int’l Studies 137-155, 144. 
4 
 
and the ways in which they are constructed so as to understand and interpret their different 
internal logics.”7  This approach is productive for examining international justice and the 
liberal peace because it draws attention to the ways in which their relationship is mediated by 
certain sets of ideas and practices that reflect particular logics and these logics, in turn, 
structure their interactions.  Peace usually refers to peace between states, whereas human 
rights tend to be about the domestic arena.  The liberal peace is statist in that the priority is 
peace between collective actors (the warring parties) rather than human rights, which are at 
the heart of the project of international justice.  As a security culture, the liberal peace 
involves a combination of statist objectives and statist methods of enforcement that 
contradicts the logic of a human rights approach and complicates its pursuit in practice. 
The article proceeds in three sections.  The first section traces the evolution of 
international justice from its origins in the wake of World War II to its revival half a century 
later with the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal.  The aim is to elaborate a distinctive 
conception of ‘security’ that emerges from this trajectory, addressing questions such as 
security for whom, security from what, and security by what means.  The following section 
examines the jurisprudence of the ICTY to determine whether judicial practice has tended to 
promote this distinctive approach to security.  The final section explores the interactions of 
international justice and liberal peace interventions in the Balkans, focusing in particular on 
three types of security instruments that have been deployed in the region in conjunction with 
international justice: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.   
 
2. Reinventing Justice, Reframing Security 
The foundations of international criminal justice were laid down by the Allies in the wake of 
World War II with the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(Nuremberg Tribunal) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo 
(Tokyo Tribunal) for the prosecution of major war criminals of the defeated Axis powers.
8
  
International justice had been suspended for nearly five decades when the Security Council 
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unanimously decided to establish the ICTY in February 1993.
9
  The decision was seen as 
advancing the principles and legacy of the Nuremberg trials.  There were, however, 
fundamental differences between the birth of international justice and its resurrection half a 
century later.  With respect to the main purpose and justification of conducting criminal 
prosecutions at the international level, the Nuremberg Tribunal was set up to punish violations 
of state sovereignty committed in the context of a ‘total war’, whereas the Yugoslav Tribunal 
was created to prosecute human rights violations inflicted in pursuit of ‘ethnic cleansing’.  
The different rationales are reflected in the character of the central offense and have shaped 
the exercise of international justice at these junctures in other important ways, harnessing 
international law and forum to promote shifting paradigms of security. 
 An early version of the rationale behind the Nuremberg trials was set out in a report of 
the Czechoslovak delegate to the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC, a body 
created to investigate crimes and identify suspects) in March 1944, which made the case for 
the offenses subsequently codified in the Nuremberg Charter as ‘crimes against peace’: 
 
His thesis was that the paramount crime was the launching and waging of the Second 
World War, and that individuals responsible for it should be held penally liable and 
tried accordingly. The criminal nature of the last war was found to derive from its aim 
and methods.  The aims were to enslave foreign nations, to destroy their civilization 
and physically annihilate a considerable section of their population on racial, political 
or religious grounds.  The methods arouse from the fact that it was a “total” war, 
which disregarded all humanitarian considerations lying at the root of the laws and 
customs of war, and introduced indiscriminate means of warfare and barbaric methods 
of occupation.
10
 
 
The central offense selected for prosecution and punishment was the violation of state 
sovereignty pursued by means of military conquest and occupation.  Crimes against peace 
were prosecuted as the paramount crime at Nuremberg, defined as “planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements and assurances, or participation in a common plan and conspiracy for the 
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accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”11  War crimes and crimes against humanity were 
also prosecuted at Nuremberg but these offenses were seen as secondary because they 
emanated, as it were, from the cardinal crime of planning and waging aggressive war.  The 
hierarchy of crimes was made explicit in the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal, where crimes 
against humanity and war crimes on their own were not sufficient for assuming jurisdiction: 
“The Tribunal shall have the power to try and punish Far Eastern war criminal who as 
individuals or members of organizations are charged with offenses that include Crimes 
against Peace.” 12  The Nuremberg Judgment reaffirmed the superior status of crimes against 
peace in relation to other international crimes: 
 
The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged aggressive wars 
are charges of the utmost gravity.  War is essentially an evil thing.  Its consequences 
are not confined to the belligerent States but affect the whole world.  
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the 
supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains 
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.
13
 
 
Nuremberg’s obsession with aggression has been the subject of much criticism. One 
problem was the way it affected the framing of crimes against humanity, the other major 
innovation of the trials, by establishing a nexus to international armed conflict.  Crimes 
against humanity could be prosecuted only in connection with either crimes against peace or 
war crimes, even though this charge was supposed to capture the crimes of the Holocaust.  
Hannah Arendt observed that what had prevented the judges from doing full justice to crimes 
against humanity was that the Nuremberg Charter “demanded that this crime, which had so 
little to do with war that its commission actually conflicted with and hindered the war’s 
conduct, was to be bound up with the other crimes.”14  Others have argued that the 
Nuremberg legacy was compromised by limiting the enforcement of human rights to 
atrocities committed in the course of pursuing aggressive war by the defeated party, raising 
the problem of ‘victors’ justice’.  David Luban observers that the aspirations of the 
Nuremberg trials to vindicate the rights of human beings were called into question by the 
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failure to prosecute crimes committed in Germany before the war as well as those committed 
by Allied war criminals.
15
  
 Against the background of Nuremberg, the creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal could be 
interpreted not simply as a revival but a reinvention of international criminal justice, 
signalling a paradigm shift. The main concern of the international community was the 
growing evidence of mass atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.  By late 1992, the Security 
Council had put in place a commission to investigate violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the region.
16
 The Commission of Experts reported that mass killings, rape, 
torture and destruction of civilian, cultural and religious property had been committed in the 
context of ethnic cleansing, and suggested that an international criminal tribunal was 
established to investigate and prosecute the ongoing violations.
17
  Acting under Chapter VII 
powers of the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council 
established the ICTY with a mandate to bring to justice those responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991.
18
  
The primacy of human rights in the new paradigm is evident from what was included 
in the substantive jurisdiction of the Tribunal – war crimes (grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and violations of the laws and customs of war), crimes against 
humanity, and genocide – and what was missing: crimes against peace.  Prosecution and 
punishment at the international level was justified in relation to supressing human rights 
violations rather than violations of state sovereignty.  Despite the fact that the Security 
Council acted under Chapter VII and the disintegration of Yugoslavia had sparked heated 
debates over sovereignty, international justice was not concerned with aggression – the classic 
threat to international peace and security as these are traditionally understood.  It was invoked 
as a response to ethnic cleansing targeting the civilian population. In line with this approach, 
the definition of crimes against humanity was expanded to incorporate offenses such as rape 
and torture.
19
          
The Security Council established the ICTY in the midst of the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the understanding that bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice 
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would contribute to halting and redressing such violations and this, in turn, would facilitate 
the restoration and maintenance of peace.
20
  This unorthodox approach was animated by a 
particular logic, reflecting the idea that the prospect for peace in the former Yugoslavia 
depended on suppressing extreme nationalism and criminalizing its goals and methods: ethnic 
cleansing and genocide.
21
  International justice was viewed as a particularly suitable 
instrument in that respect because it focused on perpetrators and victims as individuals, 
effectively countering the narratives of collective guilt and victimhood that were prevalent in 
the region and fuelling the conflict.  Madeline Albright, who spearheaded the efforts to 
establish the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals while serving as US Ambassador to the UN, 
put it this way at the time: 
 
[T]he tribunal will make it easier for the Bosnian people to reach a genuine peace.  
The scars left on the bodies and in the minds of the survivors of this war will take time 
to heal.  In too many places, neighbours were betrayed by neighbour and friend 
divided by friend by fierce and hostile passion.  Too many families have assembled at 
too many cemeteries for us to say that ethnic differences in Bosnia do not matter.  But 
responsibility for these crimes does not rest with Serbs or Croats or Muslims as 
peoples; it rests with the people who ordered and committed the crimes.  The wounds 
opened by this war will heal much faster if collective guilt is expunged and individual 
responsibility is assigned.
22
          
 
This particular framing of the Tribunal’s contribution to peace in the Balkans by 
individualising guilt for atrocity crimes was subsequently embraced by the judges and 
prosecutors as well; in fact, they have gone to great lengths to dispel any suspicion that that 
the Tribunal might be meting out collective guilt and punishment.  Former Chief Prosecutor 
Carla Del Ponte emphasized that point in her opening speech at the trial of Slobodan 
Milošević: “No state or organisation is on trial here today.  The indictments do not accuse an 
entire people of being collectively guilty of the crimes, not even the crimes of genocide.”23  
This is a self-consciously liberal conception of justice, centred on individuals as bearers of 
rights and responsibility for violations, and its contribution to peace. 
                                                 
20
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 In sum, the evolution of international justice from its origins at the Nuremberg trials to 
its reinvention half a century later with the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal could be 
interpreted as a shift in security paradigms from statism to human rights.  A distinctive 
conception of ‘security’ can be detected in the pursuit of international justice in the former 
Yugoslavia by addressing three questions.  First, security for whom?  Breaking with the state-
centricity of the Nuremberg paradigm, in the new paradigm of international justice the 
referent object of security are individuals rather than states.  Second, security from what?  The 
key shift in this respect is from violations of state sovereignty to violations of human rights, in 
particular atrocities, expulsions and other human rights abuses committed in the context of 
ethnic cleansing. Finally, security by what means? International justice contributes to security 
by enforcing the rights of victims to redress under international law and holding perpetrators 
accountable by assigning individual criminal responsibility, and thereby also serving to 
supress extreme nationalism and counter narratives of collective guilt.  Taken together, these 
three dimensions effectively recast international justice as a security strategy premised on a 
liberal understanding of criminal law’s contribution to security.24  
 
3. Adapting and Developing the Law    
Although the pursuit of international justice in the Balkans appeared to promise a shift in 
security thinking and practice, it was also clear from the start that fulfilling that promise even 
partially was bound to involve grappling with serious challenges and was anything but 
predetermined.  Some of the challenges were beyond the control of the Tribunal, for example 
arresting and transferring suspects to The Hague, but others were within its powers.  This 
section examines a set of tensions and problems arising in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal 
and considers the ways in which the judges have sought to respond by adapting and 
developing international law. 
 Adapting the law to the logic and purposes of the new paradigm has been pursued by 
the ICTY primarily in two ways: firstly, by addressing some of the statist assumptions of the 
Nuremberg paradigm and international humanitarian law to better reflect the character of the 
violence in the former Yugoslavia and, secondly, by extending the normative reach of the law 
to encompass new subjects and offenses that become important from a human rights 
perspective.  
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 One aspect of the state-centricity of international humanitarian law concerns the 
classic distinction between ‘international’ armed conflict between states and ‘non-
international’ or ‘internal’ armed conflict within states.  The emphasis on state borders and 
sovereignty animates this distinction not only in a descriptive sense but also normatively since 
the same type of abuses may be proscribed and give rise to individual criminal responsibility 
when committed in interstate conflicts but not in civil ones – a discrepancy in the laws of war 
that Steven Ratner has called one of the ‘schizophrenias’ of international criminal law.25  A 
lot was at stake for the Tribunal when it secured its first defendant, Duško Tadić, and the 
proceedings began.  The Security Council had abstained from determining the character of the 
hostilities in the former Yugoslavia when it established the Tribunal, leaving the issue to the 
judges. 
 There were two problems in applying the distinction to the Yugoslav wars of 
disintegration. First, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not fit easily either the 
‘international’ or ‘internal’ category. State borders in the former Yugoslavia were porous, 
shifting, and hotly contested; if anything, the character of the conflict appeared to be regional 
and transnational.
26
  Second, the distinction was normatively loaded in a way that could not 
withstand critical scrutiny.  Given the gravity of the violations committed in the region, the 
distinction risked frustrating the humanitarian purposes of the law and appeared unsustainable 
from a human rights perspective.  In dealing with these problems, the ICTY has pursued a 
twofold approach in its jurisprudence.  On the one hand, it has acknowledged that an armed 
conflict may have both international and non-international elements and has sought to 
determine under what circumstances an internal conflict may become ‘internationalized’.27  
At the same time, the judges have strived to narrow the gap in protection and have criticised 
the distinction on principle.  In the Tadić Jurisdiction Appeal, the Appeals Chamber 
highlighted the problems with the distinction as far as human beings were concerned:  
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Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton 
destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe 
weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in 
war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection 
when armed violence has erupted “only” within the territory of a sovereign State? If 
international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, 
must gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the 
aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its weight.
28
     
 
 The state-centric view of war that underpinned much of the relevant international law 
presented other challenges for the Tribunal.  What Mary Kaldor calls ‘new wars’ are typically 
fought by networks of state and non-state actors.
29
  In the Yugoslav wars of disintegration, 
such networks included an array of military and paramilitary forces, regular and irregular 
police units, militias, criminal groups, private security companies and other actors.  One of the 
legacies of Nuremberg and subsequent domestic trials for the Holocaust in places like France 
was that crimes against humanity required a nexus to state policy.
30
  Dusko Tadic, however, 
was not a modern-day Eichmann or Goering; he had been running a café and karate courses in 
Kozarac, a small town in North-Western Bosnia, not armies or ministries.  To do justice to 
crimes against humanity committed in the context of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, where 
these offenses appeared to capture both the goals and methods of warfare, the Tribunal had to 
acknowledge the important role of non-state actors.  The Trial Chamber held that “the law in 
relation to crimes against humanity has developed to take into account forces which, although 
not those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to move freely 
within, defined territory.”31 
 The significance of these developments at the ICTY has been widely acknowledged.  
William Schabas, for example, argues that as a result of such developments in the law, 
“perpetrators of serious violations of human rights during non-international armed conflict, 
including non-State actors, are far less likely to escape justice than they were in the past.”32  
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Much more controversial – and disruptive for the Tribunal itself – has been the effort to adapt 
the law that relates to modes of criminal liability in ways that could capture the role of state 
actors in network-based warfare and ethnic cleansing.  The complex formal and informal 
chains of command and the murky relationships forged in the wartime networks in the former 
Yugoslavia were bound to create problems for the Tribunal.  Established theories of liability, 
such as ‘direct commission’ and ‘command responsibility’, often appeared inadequate when 
applied to the facts on the ground; at the same time, Nuremberg’s controversial theories of 
collective criminal liability, such as ‘conspiracy’ and ‘criminal organisation’, were also to be 
avoided.   
 As a result, a number of cases at the ICTY have involved prosecuting suspects, 
including Slobodan Milošević, for offenses committed as part of a Joint Criminal Enterprise 
(JCE) – a doctrine that seemed to offer a viable solution but also aroused much controversy 
among international lawyers.  Initially, the issue with JCE appeared to be that prosecutors and 
judges at the Tribunal might be using the doctrine as a ‘catch-all’ device,33 whereas in 
subsequent cases the judges narrowed its interpretation in ways that were seen by some 
observers as undermining “JCE’s unique ability to describe criminal arrangements too 
complex to fit within traditional theories of criminal liability.”34   
JCE divided the Tribunal and sparked public controversy in the case of Gotovina et 
al., involving three Croatian generals prosecuted for crimes against humanity committed in 
Operation Storm – the offensive of the Croatian forces in Krajina that effectively ended the 
war in Croatia. The Trial Chamber unanimously found two of the defendants, Ante Gotovina 
and Mladen Markač, responsible for participation in a JCE aimed at “the permanent removal 
of the Serb civilian population from the Krajina by force or threat of force, which amounted to 
and involved persecution (deportation, unlawful attacks against civilians and civilian objects 
and discriminatory and restrictive measures), deportation and forcible transfer,” and sentenced 
them to 24 and 18 years, respectively.
35
  A divided Appeals Chamber (three to two), however, 
reversed the finding of the Trial Chamber that a JCE existed beyond reasonable doubt and 
acquitted the defendants on that basis.
36
  In a strongly worded dissenting opinion, Judge Pocar 
entertained the possibility that the majority might be driven by ulterior motives in quashing 
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the JCE and characterised the entire Judgement as contradicting “any sense of justice.”37  In 
Croatia, the public and the State were galvanized by these verdicts, united first in 
condemnation and then in celebration of the rulings; in Serbia, the reverse was the case.
38
      
 The other issue that has generated much controversy in recent years, both at the 
Tribunal and in the public domain, concerns aiding and abetting liability.  It turns on whether 
the actus reus of this mode of liability requires ‘specific direction’, i.e. assistance provided by 
the accused to those who commit crimes that is specifically directed to aiding the commission 
of the crimes, or whether it is sufficient to establish knowledge that the aided forces are 
committing crimes and the aid provided would assist them in doing that.  The ICTY Trial 
Chamber rejected the specific direction standard and convicted Momčilo Perišić, former Chief 
of Staff of the Yugoslav armed forces, for aiding and abetting Bosnian Serb forces implicated 
in atrocities in Srebrenica and Sarajevo.
39
  The Appeals Chamber, however, upheld the 
specific direction standard.  Considering the nature of the aid and the suspect’s remoteness 
from the theatre, it concluded that it could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the aid 
provided by Perišić was specifically directed to assist the commission of the crimes, and 
reversed the conviction.
40
  As Marko Milanovic has pointed out, the implication of the 
approach adopted in the Perišić Appeal Judgement is that “it will be practically impossible to 
convict under aiding and abetting any political or military leader external to a conflict who is 
assisting one of the parties even while knowing that they are engaging in mass atrocities, so 
long as the leader is remote from the actual operations and is not stupid enough to leave a 
smoking gun behind him.”41  Adopting this narrow approach to aiding and abetting liability 
(in conjunction with finding, separately, that the accused did not participate in a JCE) 
subsequently led the Trial Chamber to acquit Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, former 
chiefs of Serbia’s State Security Service (DB), who had been involved in setting up and 
running irregular units implicated in mass atrocities in Bosnia and Croatia.
42
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The controversy was fuelled when Frederik Harhoff, the Danish judge sitting on the 
ICTY, attacked the President of the Tribunal, Theodor Meron, in a letter that was leaked to 
the media.  The letter accused Judge Meron of exerting pressure on his fellow judges to acquit 
defendants like Gotovina and Perišić, allegedly acting on behalf of powerful States such as the 
United States and Israel where the military establishment “felt that the tribunal was getting 
too close to top-ranking military commanders.”43  The Harhoff scandal precipitated the most 
serious crisis in the entire existence of the ICTY.  Since then, the tensions in the Tribunal and 
its jurisprudence on aiding and abetting liability have deepened.  The Appeals Chamber in 
Šainović et al. held that specific direction was not an element of aiding and abetting liability 
under customary international law and stated that it “unequivocally rejects the approach 
adopted in the Perišić Appeal Judgement as it is in direct and material conflict with the 
prevailing jurisprudence on the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability and with customary 
international law in this regard.”44  As this article goes to press the much-anticipated decision 
of the Appeals Chamber in Stanišić & Simatović is pending and the controversy continues. 
At the same time, shifting the lens from statism to human rights has enabled the 
Tribunal to extend the normative reach of the law in relation to the substantive offenses within 
its jurisdiction, making visible and prompting prosecution of certain types of human rights 
violations that had previously been overlooked or dismissed.  In the Nuremberg paradigm, for 
example, atrocities involving civilians were often viewed as aberrations that were not dictated 
by the logic of ‘total war’ and in some cases directly conflicted with it by diverting resources 
away from the front and encumbering the war effort.  This is one reason why the Holocaust 
appeared almost incomprehensible at Nuremberg, although once the shocking nature and 
scale of these atrocities had been revealed in the course of the proceedings they did move the 
judges and influenced their sentencing practices.
45
  Other atrocities against civilians were 
typically understood as regrettable side effects of the hostilities, largely unrelated to the 
conduct of the war itself; as one contemporary commentator put it, “It should be remembered 
that these crimes are committed chiefly against enemy innocent civilians, non-combatants; 
that these violations have no relationship with military and strategic considerations.”46   
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One of the implications of the new paradigm of international justice that emerged in 
the 1990s was that certain types of human rights violations, which had been consistently 
neglected in the past, were coming into focus and taken up for prosecution and punishment.  
Historically, wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence have been viewed as little more 
than an incidental by-product of armed conflict.  The trials after World War II largely 
neglected abuses involving sexual violence, even in cases where such abuses had a direct 
relationship to the war effort such as the ‘comfort women’ system run by the Japanese 
military.
47
  Half a century later the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Violence Against 
Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, argued that rape was still “the least condemned 
international crime.”48    
Amid reports of widespread and systematic rape in Bosnia, the Security Council 
explicitly referenced sexual assaults when it created the ICTY and incorporated rape as a 
crime against humanity in the Statute.
49
  Richard Goldstone notes that the strong 
condemnation of sexual violence was a key aspect of the motivation for establishing the 
Tribunal in the first place.
50
  Reinforced by sustained attention to such violations in civil 
society and the media, these developments paved the way for a series of ground-breaking 
cases that prosecuted various forms of sexual violence as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.
51
  When evaluating the overall legacy of the Tribunal, observers often emphasise 
the “huge strides in redressing gender crimes and demonstrating that sexual violence is 
strategically used as a weapon of war and an instrument of terror.  The two Tribunals [for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda] have together rendered Judgments recognizing rape and other forms 
of sexual violence as crimes against humanity, war crimes, instruments of genocide, means of 
persecution, and forms of torture, particularly sexual violence manifested in the form of rape, 
sexual slavery, forced nudity, and sexual mutilation.”52  Such developments in the law have to 
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be understood in terms of the Yugoslav Tribunal’s self-conscious conception of the 
relationship between international law and shifting paradigms of security.  In this respect, 
when examining challenges to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in its very first case, the judges held 
that “a state-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-rights-
oriented approach.”53     
  
4. International Justice and the Liberal Peace 
Adapting and developing the law is of little significance if the former Israeli Ambassador to 
the United States, Abba Edan, is right that international law is the law “the wicked do not 
obey and the righteous do not enforce.”54  Compliance and enforcement have indeed been 
central problems for the Yugoslav Tribunal over the past two decades.  Especially with 
respect to arresting and transferring suspects to The Hague, the interests of States often 
appeared to trump human rights considerations and obstructed the course of justice.  It could 
be argued that the problems of compliance and enforcement manifest a broader set of tensions 
between statism and human rights, which arise when international interventions associated 
with the liberal peace are pursued alongside international justice.  These tensions are most 
clearly expressed in the interactions of international justice with security instruments at the 
sharp end of the liberal peace, although they can also be detected elsewhere in the toolbox of 
liberal peace interventionism.  The argument is elaborated by examining three types of 
security instruments that have been deployed concurrently with international justice in the 
Balkans: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  
 As already noted, the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal advanced a distinctive 
approach to security by recasting individuals as the referent object of security and human 
rights violations as a threat to security, and by reframing as means for promoting security the 
enforcement of rights, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators, and suppression of 
mutually exclusive nationalisms and narratives of collective guilt.  And yet, at key junctures 
when international justice was supposed to promote this approach, other security instruments 
were employed by the international community that have often contradicted and undermined 
its logic and purposes.  One such juncture was Dayton.  Peacemaking and international justice 
initially appeared to be mutually reinforcing rather than conflicting. The ICTY indicted the 
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most senior leaders of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, in the run-up 
to the peace negotiations at Dayton.  The US envoy leading the talks, Richard Holbrooke, has 
argued that the indictments made the job of the negotiators easier by allowing them to 
marginalise Karadžić and Mladić.55  The Dayton Accords were concluded in November 1995 
and incorporated provisions requiring the parties to cooperate with the Tribunal.
56
 
 The international community was desperate for peace in Bosnia and negotiated a deal 
that ended the hostilities by effectively rewarding the extremists responsible for human rights 
abuses and legitimising the outcome of ethnic cleansing.  The Dayton Accords created a 
patchwork of ethnic entities and enclaves and set up a framework of power-sharing between 
the three ‘constituent peoples’: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.  If the pursuit of international 
justice was intended to vindicate human rights, promote accountability and suppress 
nationalism, the international community appeared to be doing the opposite at Dayton – even 
as it demanded cooperation with the Tribunal on paper.  By entrenching ethnic divides and 
elites in power structures instead of creating the conditions for dismantling them, the 
settlement has engendered a sort of permanent crisis and two decades later it still requires the 
presence of peacekeepers.  As Timothy Donais notes, the result is that “the country’s politics 
remains largely segregated along ethnic lines, nationalist rhetoric continues to be the key 
currency of Bosnian political life, and the practice of reaping the spoils of office for the 
benefit of self or party continues to be the norm.”57   
The Dayton agreement affected the prospects for human rights and accountability in 
Bosnia and the wider region in several ways.  The tensions between the constitutional order 
constructed at Dayton and international human rights standards have been highlighted by the 
European Court of Human Rights.  In Sejdić and Finci it held that Bosnia’s constitutional 
provisions preventing persons not affiliated with one of the three ‘constituent peoples’ to 
stand for election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency amounted to ethnic 
discrimination.
58
  In the first years after Dayton, suspects like Karadžić and Maldić were 
allowed to move freely despite ICTY arrest warrants.  In fact, Karadžić has insisted that in 
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1996 Holbrooke made an agreement with him to withdraw from public life in exchange for 
immunity from prosecution.
59
  Holbrooke denied the allegations but other credible sources 
have corroborated them and suspicions persist.
60
 Dayton also had the effect of strengthening 
the repressive regimes of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, both of which had been 
implicated in wartime atrocities.  By entrenching Milošević (hailed as a ‘peacemaker’61 at that 
time) and neglecting the brewing crisis in Kosovo, the settlement paved the way for the 
campaign of ethnic cleansing in the province that prompted the 1999 NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia.       
Peacekeeping operations have also been disruptive for the logic and aims of 
international justice.  The underlying statist understandings of security and stability that often 
inform such operations have tended to contradict and undermine the human rights approach.  
One expression of these tensions has involved a clash between force protection and human 
rights enforcement.  States that had earlier spearheaded the effort to establish the Yugoslav 
Tribunal, such as the United States, became reluctant to put the lives of their soldiers in 
Bosnia at risk in order to apprehend suspects wanted by the ICTY: “With the memory of the 
eighteen U.S. soldiers killed in Somalia in 1993 still fresh, the U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
signed off on the [Dayton] peace agreement only after receiving assurances from the White 
House that U.S. troops would not be ordered to hunt down war criminals.”62  In line with 
force protection priorities, in the initial years NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia were instructed 
to take into custody individuals indicted by the ICTY only if they surrendered or happened to 
stumble upon international forces. 
 Another example is the Kosovo crisis. The problems with the NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia from a human rights perspective are well-known: use of cluster bombs and 
depleted uranium missiles; bombing the Serbian television and accidentally bombing the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade; air strikes that caused civilian casualties and accelerated ethnic 
cleansing on the ground.
63
  At a time when the NATO air campaign appeared to be losing 
momentum and public support, indicting Milošević was embraced as a way of legitimating 
the war and putting more pressure on Belgrade: “After years of refusing to turn over sensitive 
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intelligence data to the Tribunal in order to protect “sources and methods,” the United States 
and Britain were hurriedly handing over reams of satellite imagery, telephone intercepts, and 
other top secret information to the Prosecutor to make the case against Milosevic.”64  
Milošević and four members of his regime were indicted on 22 May 1999, sixty days into the 
seventy-eight day NATO air campaign.
65
       
 The potential of international justice to advance human rights, promote accountability 
and defuse ethnic tensions was overshadowed by the effects of NATO air strikes and 
peacekeeping, which pulled in the opposite direction.  The bombing of Yugoslavia had the 
effect of radicalizing Serbian nationalism and fuelling its narratives of victimization, 
reinforcing the traction of collectivist framings of the conflict and crimes in Serbian politics 
and society.  When Serb forces pulled out of Kosovo, KFOR deployed some 40,000 
peacekeepers to the province; their presence, however, did not prevent ethnic cleansing 
targeting the remaining Serbs and revenge attacks against Albanians accused of collaboration.  
The Kosovo Human Losses database at the Humanitarian Law Center (Belgrade and Pristina) 
has documented more than 1,600 casualties in Kosovo for the first year and a half of 
international peacekeeping (June 1999-December 2000), of which around a quarter are 
Albanian and the rest are Serb, Roma and other minorities, including many disappearances.
66
  
This high level of casualties at a time when peacekeepers had been deployed in large numbers 
reflects the reluctance of KFOR to send a clear message early on, particularly to the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), that international forces would not tolerate human rights abuses.  
The abuses and entrenchment of the KLA in power structures that occurred at that time have 
had far-reaching consequences for accountability by instilling fear in victims and witnesses, 
who have often been reluctant to come forward and testify in cases involving KLA members 
at the ICTY and at Kosovo’s hybrid courts for war crimes.      
 The most significant peacebuilding instrument employed by the international 
community in the region is the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the Western 
Balkans, a regional policy framework established by the European Union (EU) in 1999 for the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia) and Albania.  The aim of the 
instrument is to promote stabilisation through a process of progressive partnership with these 
countries that includes the prospect of association and, eventually, accession to the EU.  Full 
cooperation with the ICTY was set as a key condition for moving forward in the SAP, 
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alongside demonstrating respect for minority rights, offering real opportunities for displaced 
persons and refugees to return home and demonstrating a clear commitment to regional 
cooperation.  The war crimes conditionality has been one of the most contentious aspects of 
the SAP and has often dominated the politics of EU integration in the region.
67
 It was crucial 
for ensuring that all suspects sought by the Tribunal from the original list of 161 indicted 
persons were eventually apprehended and transferred to The Hague to stand trial, a lengthy 
and difficult process that was completed in 2011 with the arrests of Ratko Mladić and Goran 
Hadžić.   
 At the same time, the ICTY conditionality was applied rather unevenly in the SAP, 
raising the issue of selectivity, and created divisions in the EU as some Member States 
insisted on a principled approach while others preferred compromise and accommodation.  
The tensions were expressed most clearly when the EU was using the war crimes issue to 
advance strategic considerations for stability and public order at the expense of the SAP’s 
normative commitments to accountability and human rights.
68
  In the case of Croatia, the EU 
suspended accession negotiations over its failure to apprehend Gotovina and reopened them 
only after the Tribunal had been satisfied with Croatia’s efforts to cooperate.  In the case of 
Serbia, however, the ICTY conditionality was repeatedly compromised and used by the EU as 
a bargaining chip in order to influence political developments in the country and to shape its 
response to Kosovo’s declaration of independence.  Jelena Subotić observes that in that 
context “the issue of justice for crimes against humanity became an issue of the lowest order, 
a matter of deal making and compromise setting, removed as far as possible from the ideas 
and norms of dealing with the past.”69  With the completion of the Tribunal’s remaining cases 
in sight, the EU has started to shift attention in the SAP from international justice to domestic 
prosecution of war crimes. So far, however, the focus has been on building capacity for 
conducting such trials at the various domestic and hybrid courts in the region, rather than 
requiring applicant countries to demonstrate effective investigation and prosecution of war 
crimes.   
 
 
 
                                                 
67
 See J Batt and J Obradovic-Wochnik (eds) War Crimes, Conditionality, and EU Integration in the Western 
Balkans, ISS Chaillot Paper 116, June 2009. 
68
 See I Rangelov, ‘Democracy or Stability? European Approaches to Justice in Peace and Transitional 
Processes’ (2014) 5(2) Global Policy 191-200. 
69
 J Subotić, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Cornell UP 2009), 81.  
21 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The pursuit of international justice in the former Yugoslavia half a century after the 
Nuremberg trials signals a shift in security paradigms from statism to human rights, while also 
giving rise to deep tensions and contradictions between them.   Judicial practice at the ICTY 
has tended to advance this shift by adapting and developing the law in line with a human 
rights approach to security but it has not been immune to setbacks and interference, especially 
when the jurisprudence of the Tribunal has appeared to challenge entrenched interests and 
practices of States.  To the extent that the exercise of international justice depends on States 
for enforcement and for its continued existence, the Yugoslav case suggests that there are 
inherent tensions between statism and human rights that cannot be addressed by judicial 
bodies alone, in the absence of a parallel shift in the security thinking and practices of States. 
 These tensions have affected the ability of international justice to offer a security 
strategy in the Balkans in important ways.  The potential of international justice to promote a 
rights-based approach to security has been repeatedly compromised when liberal peace 
interventions in the region have been working at cross-purposes with international justice.  
Key security instruments that have been employed by the international community in the 
Balkans, such as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, reflect a set of state-centric 
ideas about security and involve related security practices that often disrupt the pursuit of 
international justice and undermine its logic and purposes.  The interactions of international 
justice with such instruments could be understood as a series of tensions between elite-
mediated peace deals, force protection priorities and an overarching concern for stability, on 
the one side, and normative commitments to promote accountability and enforce human 
rights, on the other.  When key international actors engaged in the Balkans have viewed 
stability and justice as competing security strategies, the former has tended to trump the latter 
in practice. 
 As a security culture, the liberal peace in its current form involves a set of state-centric 
ideas and practices that cannot be easily reconciled with the distinctive rights-centric 
conception of security advanced by international justice and often undermine its logic and 
purposes.  More research is needed to illuminate the complex relationship between liberal 
peace interventions and justice instruments in situations where both are deployed.  The 
Balkan case, however, calls into question the widespread assumption that transitional justice 
is an integral part of liberal peacebuilding and suggests that analysis along those lines may be 
misguided and counterproductive.  Finally, the tensions between international justice and the 
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liberal peace raise questions about one of the standard lines of critique of liberal 
peacebuilding, which argues that the problem with the liberal peace is that it is too liberal.  If 
‘liberal’ means treating individuals as the referent object of security and placing human rights 
at the heart of the means and ends of public security provision, the problem with the liberal 
peace might well be the opposite.         
 
 
   
